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INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING OF DIRECTOR AND CONSULTANTS  
INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION  
IN OFFICE OF DIRECTOR - DECEMBER 1, 1950

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Prior to opening of general discussion, [ ] proposed a certain treatment of the A-bomb theme by his Agency among the Chinese, based on a statement which a prominent scientist was prepared to give for the purpose. Following discussion, Mr. Barrett summarized the main points as follows:

1. It would be useful to get dissemination of the theme among the Chinese.
2. It was not desirable to have the theme used in the U.S. or Europe.
3. Voice of America could pick up the theme from some obscure source and play it to China.
4. It would be useful to have the theme played in Hong Kong by Nationalist elements.

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It was agreed that [redacted] Agency should procure the statement from the scientist mentioned, and then work out procedures for the placement and use of the material along the lines of the above summary.

The Director, in moving to general discussion, said that there were no set items for the agenda, but that he had felt it desirable to call a special meeting in view of the seriousness of the situation in Korea.

He presented an estimate of the general situation by the Intelligence Section of the Department of State, stressing its gravity. He felt that the Board should:

1. Ensure planning in the propaganda field which would help to deter expansionism by the Chinese Communists or other forces.
2. Reexamine long-range planning, contemplated use of facilities, etc. in the Government's information program.

Mr. Barrett asked whether others felt that the intelligence estimate was in proper perspective; no dissent was expressed.

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## **State Department review completed**

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Mr. Barrett stated that his office had sent out a circular telegram to public affairs officers in Western Europe and some parts of the world for an appraisal of public opinion in their respective areas, and requested Mr. Phillips to summarize the replies. Mr. Phillips stated that the following main points emerged from the replies:

1. There was deep apprehension of the danger of a general war.
2. The U.S. should try all peaceful means to handle the present situation.
3. There was criticism of General MacArthur for not following UN directives.
4. It was feared that under the pressure of U.S. public opinion, the U.S. was rushing into an adventure.
5. There was repugnance to the use of the A-bomb.

Mr. Barrett observed that these replies indicated an obvious propaganda job, in addition to deterring the Chinese or Soviet Communists in their present course; this job was to "put spunk into a jittery Western Europe." He felt this in spite of the fact that an intelligence estimate, based on the opinion among Western European UN delegates, added up to a belief that the Soviets were not yet ready to engage in an all-out war, but only to embroil the U.S. with the Chinese in the Far East.

General McClure asked whether the Board felt that publication of an Army decision to revoke certain holiday leave would be useful. It was agreed that it would be.

With respect to deterrents, Mr. Phillips said that he had a strong feeling that the Soviet population was really a better deterrent to Soviet expansionism than the A-bomb and that we should perhaps take another look at our defector policies and program.

During discussion on this point, General McClure felt that a modest program based on "selective defection" was desirable, rather than one based on mass defection. He felt that it was important to concentrate on individual defectors, who could be trained and sent back into Russia as agents to assist perhaps in forming a foreign legion. General Magruder agreed that we did not want just a mass of dissatisfied defectors and pointed out that the whole question of the defectors was now under serious study by an ad hoc committee with interdepartmental representation; he felt that the thing to do was to expedite this study. It was agreed that Mr. Barrett, on behalf of the Board, would undertake to urge this.

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Mr. Phillips, as a tangent of the question of defectors, said that he felt the need of a thorough reexamination of our output to Russia to see whether we were following effective and realistic objectives at this time.

Mr. Barrett reverted to the possibility of the use of deterrents on Communist expansion at this time, as well as bolstering the morale of our friends, and asked whether we had anything up our sleeves for emergency use (balloons, leaflets, etc.) to use now on the Chinese troops in Korea or the Chinese mainland.

In the course of ensuing discussion, the following points emerged:

1. General Magruder felt that we should seek a policy decision to use the Chinese on Formosa for propaganda purposes. He noted that earlier efforts in this direction had been canceled and felt that it would be in order now if the Formosa Nationalists were kept out of politics.
2. General McClure felt that we should put a propaganda expert on our military mission in Formosa and this was agreed. Mr. Berding pointed out that ECA had a good man there.
3. [Redacted]
4. [Redacted]
5. Mr. Berding suggested the possibility of a fortnight's swing by General Eisenhower around Western Europe, perhaps in a purely private capacity, which he felt would have the effect of reassuring the people of that area, since General Eisenhower was so well and favorably known.
6. Mr. Barrett asked whether a Pentagon statement was in preparation to refute the anti-MacArthur outcry in Western Europe. General McClure stated that such a statement was in preparation to show the comparative phasing of General MacArthur's and the Chinese offensives.

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Mr. Barrett asked the status of the planning under which State Department personnel and facilities would be turned over in wartime to theater commanders. Mr. Phillips said that he and Mr. Block were working on this. General McClure reported that the Army plan for the adaptation of such facilities and personnel in theaters had been completed that day.

Mr. Hulten referred to problems that were arising in connection with the wartime use of radio transmitters and other production centers and felt the need to re-explore the possibility of using shipboard transmitters.

Mr. Barrett, in closing the meeting, felt that the Board should meet at least twice weekly hereafter.

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